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Abstract
This paper uses a strategic licensing framework to study firms’ licens-
ing behaviour when there are two generations of technology in the market.
The innovations are sequential with the second invention built on the first
one. We analyse two different licensing schemes: fixed fee payment and
royalty payment. The results indicate that the optimal licensing strat-
egy depends on the market size and magnitudes of the two innovations.
When two inventors use the same licensing scheme, for most parameter
ranges, royalty payment scheme out-performs fixed fee payment scheme
for inventor one if the second technology is significant. When inventors
can choose different licensing schemes endogenously, for some parameter
ranges, the early inventor prefers licensing by royalty and the second gen-
eration inventor prefers licensing by fixed fee. Contrary to the standard
literature with outside innovators, royalty can be supported as the best
licensing scheme.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies patent owners’ strategic licensing behaviour when technolo-
gies are cumulative. It is widely recognised that some industries are charac-
terised by a high degree of cumulativeness in innovation. Some examples are
biotechnology, computer software, and semiconductor industries.1 Based on a
data set compiled with 46 products, Gort and Klepper (1982) found an av-
erage of 19 sequential improvements to 23 major innovations. The comple-
mentarity of technologies gives quite different implications for licensing from
the standard literature of intellectual property rights with technologies being
substitutes. However, despite a large existing literature on strategic licensing,
sequential innovations have never been analysed.
The cumulativeness of technology is addressed in the sequential innovation
literature. Researchers have studied how patent and anti-trust policies should
be shaped after taking into consideration the cumulative nature in technology.
However, in the literature, the strategic interactions between the licensor and
the licensee are not modelled explicitly. This paper aims at filling this gap in
answering how the early inventor should license its technology when it foresees
the arrival of superior technologies. Although the focus is on the early inventor’s
licenising strategy, we also address the second generation inventor’s optimal
choice. In this paper, we first analyse the game when both inventors use the
same licensing scheme and then extend to the case when the licensing scheme
is an endogenous choice.
In the strategic licensing literature, the standard result is that when the in-
ventor does not produce the final goods, royalty licensing is the least preferred
option compared with fixed fee and auction schemes (Kamien and Tauman
(1984, 1986)). However, royalty payments are common in licensing agreements.
Rostoker (1983) reported that for corporate licensing, 46% of them take the
form of two-part tariff agreements, 13% use a fixed fee, and 39% employ royalty
payments. Macho-Stadler et al. (1996) also report significant use of royalty
1 In biotechnology industry, many applications employ the same basic technology and the
implication of the use of patented research tools have attracted some scholars’ attention (for
example, see Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and Walsh et al. (2003)). It is also recognised that
in the semiconductor industries, designing a microprocessor requires multiple patents.
2
payments in licensing agreements for Spanish firms. With the inclusion of se-
quential innovations, we are able to support the use of royalty payments in our
model.
The introduction of sequential innovations offers some other new insights
into the strategic licensing literature. First, the standard literature only has
one inventor in the technology market. With only one inventor in the market,
the licensor acts as a monopolist as well as a Stackleberg leader in the licensing
game. When there are more than one inventor in the market, on top of the game
among licensors and licensees, the strategic interactions among the licensors
matter. As shown in this paper, with the existence of the second inventor,
the early inventor switches from fixed fee licensing to royalty licensing. In the
literature, it is often the case that the inventor reaps all the benefit brought
about by the new technology, leaving the licensees with the same or less profit.
In this paper, some licensees could have higher profit in the post-innovation
market if at least one inventor chooses to license by a fixed fee.
Two technologies are cumulative in this paper. In particular, we assume
that the technologies are sequential and in order to utilise the second generation
technology, firms must have a licence for the first technology. This assumption
enables us to have the technologies given in the beginning of the game we do not
model stochastic arrival of new technologies.2 There are some justifications for
this assumption. It could be that the second technology is an add-on application
and requires the first technology as a platform to work on. An example would be
computers’ operating system and application programs.3 Or it could be that the
improvement is not significant enough and the second technology infringes on
the first technology given the patentability requirement.4 Note that, in the U.S.,
2 It is not necessary to have both technologies given in the beginning of the game. As long
as technologies arrive deterministically, results remain qualitatively the same.
3For example, consumers with MS Windows operating system can use WordPad for word
processing or they can purchase MS Office software. To use MS Office, consumers need to
have the Windows operating system installed.
4 In such a case, there are three possible outcomes for the second technology’s patent appli-
cation. The patent could be granted or not granted. When the patent is granted, it could be
ruled that it infringes or does not infringe on the first innovation. The assumption here corre-
sponds to the case (granted, infringes). In this case, the first inventor holds a blocking patent
for the second technology. Firms can only use the second generation technology with licences
from both inventors. The first patent is called the ”dominant” patent and the improvement
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when a patent is granted to an improvement on some invention, it is usually the
case that the former infringes on the latter (Lemley (1997)). Another example is
the use of upstream discoveries as research tools. For example, such phenomenon
is common in biomedical research. We assume that both inventors do not have
the production capacity. They generate profit by licensing the technologies to
firms in the downstream market. The inventors can be some specialised R&D
laboratories. This corresponds to Kamien and Tauman’s outside story.5
With such a setting, there is another interesting question to answer. Since
we require the possession of the first generation technology for using the second
technology, the former is a complement to the latter. However, for the first
technology, the second technology could be a complement or a substitute. It is
not clear if the existence of the second technology adds value to the first one or
competes away rents. On the one hand, firms may be willing to pay more for the
first technology since it gives them the right to purchase the second technology.
On the other hand, since the first technology can be used alone without the
second technology, with the superior second technology in the market, the value
of the first technology decreases. Whether or not the second technology increases
the return to the first technology depends on the degree of substitution between
them. The conclusion of this paper suggests that in the fixed fee payment
scheme, the substitution effect dominates and inventor one’s profit decreases
with the magnitude of cost saving brought about by the second invention.
This also leads to one of the main results of this paper: if two inventors
employ the same licensing scheme and the cost reduction of the second technol-
ogy is not too small, it is usually the case that a royalty gives the first inventor
higher payoff compared with a fixed fee payment. This is the opposite of what
is concluded in the standard strategic licensing literature with one single out-
side inventor. This result also confirms the popularity of royalty payment in
practice. When endogenous choice of licensing schemes is allowed, for some
parameter ranges, the first inventor licenses by royalty and the second inventor
licenses by a fixed fee.
patent is called the ”subservient” patent.
5An outside inventor is one who does not compete in the product market. The definition
is opposed to that of an inside inventor where R&D and final good production is integrated
within one firm.
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The intuition for this result is that with royalty payments, inventors are
guaranteed the profit corresponding to the magnitudes of their invention since
the royalty charges determine firms’ effective marginal costs. However, with
fixed fee payments, an efficient second generation technology competes away
too much rent. Therefore, as the second innovation gets more significant, it is
more likely that the first inventor prefers licensing by royalty payment. The
prediction of this model suggests that in industries characterised by high degree
of cumulativeness in technology, we may observe that early inventors license by
royalty payments and subsequent inventors license by fixed fee payments.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We first briefly review the
related literature and present our model setting. Section 4 analyses the fixed
fee payment scheme and section 5 studies royalty scheme. Section 6 presents
the comparison of the two schemes. The model is then extended to consider en-
dogenous choice of licensing schemes. Finally, we give some concluding remarks
and possible future extensions.
2 Related Literature
This paper relates to two streams of studies: licensing and sequential innova-
tions. There is a large literature on technology licensing.6 The literature on
strategic licensing dates back to Arrow (1962) who shows that when licensing
by royalty payments, the patentee generates more profit by licensing to a com-
petitive market than to a monopolist. Kamien and Tauman and their co-authors
have demonstrated that for an outside innovator, the best licensing scheme is
the auction scheme, followed by a fixed fee payment, while royalty is the least
preferred option. This finding is puzzling given the popularity of royalty pay-
ments in licensing agreements and triggered many follow up studies trying to
identify conditions under which royalty payments may serve as the best means
for licensing. Wang (1998) and Kamien and Tauman (2002) show that royalty
6Some research questions studied include the relationship between licensing and firms’
R&D behaviour (Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Lin (1997)), the likelihood and strategic
use of ex ante and ex post licensing (Gallini (1984), Gallini and Winter (1984), and Shapiro
(1985)), comparison of different licensing schemes (Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986, 2002)),
and sequential innovations and licensing strategies (Green and Scotchmer (1994)).
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payment is the best licensing scheme for an inside inventor. When the inventor
is one of the producing firm in the Cournot market, royalty serves as an in-
strument to obtain strategic advantages against the rivals. Other papers which
support the use of royalty include Beggs (1992) with asymmetric information
and Poddar and Sinha (2002) with Hotelling modelling.
There are some other papers which deal with other strategic reasons for
licensing. Rockett (1990) analyses the case when the patentee uses licensing as
an instrument to choose its competitior in the market after the patent expires.
Gallini (1984) shows that licensing can be used as a means for entry deterrence
when the entrants can choose between getting a licence or conducting its own
R&D. These papers do not compare differnt licensing schemes for the patentee
and there is a single licensor in the market.
This paper extends Kamien and Tauman’s analysis to study sequential inno-
vations by including a second generation technology in the innovation market.
In the literature, there is usually only one inventor in the technology market.7
In this paper, we show that with the set up of sequential innovations, royalty
payment is usually the best option for the first generation inventor if the cost
saving of the second technology is significant. When the licensing scheme is
chosen endogenously, for some parameter ranges, the first inventor licenses by
royalty and the second inventor licenses by a fixed fee.
There are two main focuses in the sequential innovation literature. The first
one concerns if the first inventor can appropriate sufficient rent for adequate
R&D incentives (O’Donoghue (1998) and Scotchmer (1991)). The second line
of research studies patentees’ licensing decisions and the implications of anti-
trust regulations (Chang (1995), Green and Scotchmer (1989), Kaplow (1994),
and Scotchmer (1991)). The solution concept adopted for the licensing subgame
is usually Nash bargaining and strategic interaction in the licensing subgame
is never the focus. In this paper, we bring strategic licensing into sequential
innovations and suggest that one way to secure more rent for the early inventors
is to license by royalty agreements.
7Exceptions include Poddar and Sinha (2002) and Arora and Fosfuri (2003). Both papers
deal with competing technologies instead of sequential inventions.
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3 The Model
Assume that there are N firms in the product market and two inventors, Ii,
i = 1, 2, in the innovation market. The N firms compete in the Cournot fashion.
The two inventors are outside inventors and do not have the capacity to produce
the final goods. In the pre-innovation market, all firms have marginal cost
c. Inventor one holds a patent on some process innovation which reduces the
marginal cost to c−x. Inventor two has an improvement on the first generation
technology which reduces the cost to c − x − y, with y being the incremental
cost saving. Firms can only use the second generation technology if they already
have a licence from the first inventor.
We analyse two licensing schemes: a fixed fee payment and a royalty pay-
ment. With a fixed fee payment, firms pay an one-off upfront payment for using
the technology. With a royalty payment, firms pay a royalty charge for per unit
of output. Royalty charges affect firms’ marginal costs. We start with the case
that two inventors use the same licensing scheme and then discuss inventors’
endogenous choice of licensing schemes.
The timing of the game is as follows. Both technologies are given in the
beginning of the game and it is common knowledge that a licence for the first
technology is required for using the second technology.8 In the first period, I1
announces its licensing strategy, and firms make the decision of getting a licence
or not. In the second period, I2 announces its licensing strategy and firms which
have got a licence from I1 decide whether or not to get a licence from I2. In the
last period, knowing every one’s licensing decision and the licensing strategies,
firms compete by setting quantities in the marketplace. This is a game with
complete information and all the players know all the relevant history.
Assumption 1 Q = a− p for p ≤ a and Q = 0 for p > a, where Q =∑Ni=1 qi.
Assumption 2 The innovation is non-drastic. The monopoly price with the
latest technology is not lower than c, the perfect competitive price with the old
technology. This gives,
pm (c− x− y) =
a+ c− x− y
2
> c
8We do not analyse the possibility of submarine patents here.
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or
x+ y < a− c.
4 Fixed-fee Payment Scheme
In this scheme, Ii chooses the fee, Fi, and firms decide whether or not to get
a licence. Let the number of licences issued by inventor i be ki. Given our
licensing requirement, k2 ≤ k1. Denote Ii’s profit as Πi, Πi = kiFi. After the
licensing subgames, there are three groups of firms, (k2, k1 − k2, N − k1), with
different marginal costs, (c− x− y, c− x, c), in the product market.
4.1 Product market competition
We solve the game backwards and start with the Cournot market equilibrium.
Index the three groups of firms by the licences they have. When one firm gets
a licence, there is one more efficient firm in the market and all other firms’
output decreases. By getting licences, a firm creates negative externality for
other firms. With sufficient number of efficient firms, inefficient firms produce
zero output and are driven out of the market.
Definition 1 Partition the market into three regions in (k1, k2) space. In region
one, xk1 +yk2 ≤ a− c, all firms have positive output in the market. In region
two, xk1 +yk2 ≤ a− c and yk2 ≤ a− c+ x, firms with marginal cost c exit the
market and there are only two groups of firms with positive output. In region
three, yk2 ≥ a− c+ x, only the most efficient firms produce in the market. The
three regions are depicted in Figure 1.
Note that with the restriction k2 ≤ k1, the relevant area in Figure 1 is below
the forty-five degree line.
Lemma 1 Index firms by the licences they have. The three groups of firms have
equilibrium output levels as follows. A firm’s profit is equal to q2i −Fi for qi > 0
and 0 otherwise. Let α1 ≡ a−c−k1xy and α2 ≡ a−c+xy .
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Figure 1: Market regions in (k1, k2) space.
In region one (k2 < α1),
q12 =
a− c− k1x− k2y
(N + 1)
+ x+ y,
q1 =
a− c− k1x− k2y
(N + 1)
+ x,
q =
a− c− k1x− k2y
(N + 1)
.
In region two (α1 ≤ k2 < α2),
q12 =
a− c+ x− k2y
(k1 + 1)
+ y,
q1 =
a− c+ x
(k1 + 1)
− k2y
(k1 + 1)
,
q = 0.
In region three (k2 ≥ α2),
q12 =
a− c+ x+ y
(k2 + 1)
,
q1 = 0,
q = 0.
Proposition 1 There is no equilibrium in region three.
The intuition is that in region three, only the most efficient firms remain in
the market. Since firms cannot make positive profit without the possession of
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a licence from I2 and since being the first mover, I1 cannot price discriminate
between firms within groups k2 and k1−k2, I2 can charge the fee equal to firms’
entire profit. For example, given F1 and a firm’s profit π. Suppose that the
firm gets a licence from I1. Consider F2 = π − ε. If not getting a licence from
I2, firms’ payoff is −F1. If getting a licence from I2, firms’ payoff is ε − F1.
Firms are still better off paying F2 and getting a licence. This is due to the fact
that in the second licensing game, F1 is a sunk cost and does not affect firms’
willingness to pay for a licence from I2. In equilibrium, let ε→ 0, I2 charges the
total profit π.9 This gives I1 zero profit in region three. Being the first mover in
the game, I1 never picks up a licensing level which drives the game into region
three.
4.2 The improvement licensing game
In the second period licensing game, knowing that firms compete in the Cournot
fashion in the third stage, inventor two solves its profit maximisation problem.
4.2.1 Firms’ incentive constraints
For firms to get a licence, Fi must satisfy firms’ incentive compatibility con-
straints. The maximum fee Ii can charge is the difference of firms’ profit with
and without a licence. For any market structure, (k2, k1 − k2, N − k1) to be
an equilibrium, it must be the case that given (F1, F2), no firm would have the
incentive to switch to other production groups. F1 and F2 must be high enough
so that no additional firm would like to subscribe to the technologies. F1 and F2
must be also low enough such that the existing licensees remain getting licences.
Note that when a firm considers to switch, its outside opportunity is determined
by the new market structure induced by the switch. As will be discussed more
later, after taking into consideration of the fees, three groups of firms have dif-
ferent profit levels in equilibrium. But the difference is small enough so that no
firm has the incentive to switch.
Take the case when the equilibrium falls within region one as an exam-
ple. Let (k2, k1 − k2, N − k1) be an equilibrium market outcome. For a firm
9At the boundary of regions two and three, I2 cannot charge firms’ total profit. This will
be discussed later.
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within group k2, its profit is π12 (k2, k1 − k2, N − k1). If not getting a licence
from I2, the firm switches to group k1 − k2.10 The new market structure is
(k2 − 1, k1 − k2 + 1, N − k1) and the switching firm would have profit level
π1 (k2 − 1, k1 − k2 + 1, N − k1) .
Therefore π1 (k2 − 1, k1 − k2 + 1, N − k1) is the outside opportunity a firm within
group k2 can get if it decides not to remain getting a licence from I2. Therefore,
the maximum F2 is
π12 (k2, k1 − k2, N − k1)− π1 (k2 − 1, k1 − k2 + 1, N − k1) .
The fee I2 can charge in region two is determined in the same way with the
adjustment that only two groups of firms produce positive quantities.
FR22 = π12 (k2, k1 − k2)− π1 (k2 − 1, k1 − k2 + 1) ,
where the superscript denotes the region. The following lemma summarises the
fee I2 charges.
Lemma 2
F2 =


[2 (a− c+ x+ y) +N (2x+ y)− 2 (k1x+ k2y)] Ny(N+1)2 if k2 < α1;
yN y(N+2)+2x(N+1)
(N+1)2
if k2 = α1;
[2 (a− c+ x+ y) + yk1 − 2yk2] yk1(k1+1)2 if k2 > α1.
I2’s profit is Π2 = F2k2.
It can be shown that the equilibrium fees also satisfy the other part of the
incentive constraint and the non-licensees do not have the incentive to get a
licence.
In region one, the maximum fee I2 can charge increases with a − c due to
larger surplus in the market. FR12 decreases with k1 and k2 since increasing the
number of efficient firms decreases profit for every other firms. How damaging
the effects of increasing k1 and k2 are depend on the magnitudes of cost reduc-
tion, x and y. Increasing x increases FR12 . This is due to the assumption that
firms with the second generation technology must also have the first generation
technology. An increase of x increases both π12 (k2 + 1, k1 − k2 − 1, N − k1)
10Since it is a sequential move game, I2 takes k1 as given when solving for its best response.
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and π1 (k2, k1 − k2, N − k1) with the former growing at a faster rate. The effect
of y on FR12 is uncertain. The bigger y is, the more valuable the invention,
and hence the more I2 can charge. However, with a bigger y, the increase of
k2 creates more competition among the firms and therefore decreases the profit
difference I2 can collect. Note that ∂F
R1
2 /∂N > 0. As N increases, both
π12 (k2 + 1, k1 − k2 − 1, N − k1) and π1 (k2, k1 − k2, N − k1) decrease. The lat-
ter decreases more then the former. In region two, FR22 decreases with k2. The
effect of k1 on F
R2
2 is uncertain since increasing k1 increases the total market
size.
Note that when k2 licenses exactly on the boundary, k2 = α1, once a licensee
switches to be a non-licensee, the market falls back to region one and N − k1
firms can have some positive output. Before the switch, the market structure is
(α1, k1 − α1). After one firm switches from group k2 to group k1−k2, the market
becomes less competitive and falls into region one with the market structure
(α1 − 1, k1 − α1 + 1, N − k1). This gives
FR22
∣∣
k2=
a−c−k1x
y
= yN
y (N + 2) + 2x (N + 1)
(N + 1)2
.
4.2.2 I2’s best response
As discussed above, the maximum fees inventors can charge depend on the,
market structure. For any given market structure, (k2, k1 − k2, N − k1), firms’
profit levels and maximum fees inventors can extract are determined, Fi =
Fi [ki]. Therefore
Πi = Fi [ki] ki.
We solve the game in terms of ki instead of Fi. Holding k1 constant, F2 is
monotonic (decreases) in k2. Therefore, solving k2 gives the same answer as
solving k2.
11 Let I2’s best response solved by FOC be k
Rm
2 , where the super
script denotes the best response in region m, m = 1, 2. BR2 consists k
Rm
2 when
they are interior and the boundaries when they fall out of the relevant regions.
For the inventor, when one more licence is issued, the marginal benefit is the
fee collected from this additional licensee, Fi (ki). However, issuing one more
11Monotonicity is a stronger requirement than what we need here. To have F2 determined
by k2, we only need F2 to be uniquely defined by k2 with the optimal k2 = max
{
F−12 (k2)
}
whereever F−12 (k2) is multi-valued.
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licence means that there is one more firm with lower marginal cost in the market.
With this one more efficient firm, all other firms, including all other licensees,
enjoy less profit due to more intense competition. The marginal cost of issuing
one more licence is the decrease of fees collectable from all other licensees due
to the more competitive market, − (∂Fi [ki] /∂ki) ki. I2’s best response solved
by the FOC equates the two effects, F2 [k2] = − (∂F2 [k2] /∂k2) k2.
Lemma 3 kR12 is downward sloping in k1 and k
R2
2 is upward sloping in k1.
kR12 =
a− c+ x
2y
+
x (N − k1)
2y
+
N + 2
4
, (1)
and
kR22 =
a− c+ x+ y
2y
+
k1
4
. (2)
Proof. See the appendix.
In both regions, increasing k1 makes the market more competitive and thus
reduces the marginal benefit for raising k2, F2. For the marginal cost, increasing
k1 has no effect in region one since two technologies reduce firms’ cost in an
additively separable manner. However, increasing k1 affects the marginal cost
in region two through changing the number of producing firms in the market
since only firms with a licence from I1 produce positive quantities in region
two. With a more competitive market, a firm within group k2 has lower outside
opportunity if it switches to group k1−k2. Thus in region two, I2’s best response
is upward sloping in k1.
kRm2 increases in x and decreases in y in both regions. Increasing x increases
F2 and has no effect on the marginal cost of raising k2 due to the additivity
separable property of the innovations in the cost function. This also comes
from the fact that to have the second technology, firms must have the first
technology. The first technology is a complement to the second. On the other
hand, increasing y increases F2 since the technology is more valuable. Increasing
y also increases marginal cost of raising k2 due to more intense competition in
the market. The effect on marginal cost dominates and BR2 decreases as y
increases.12 When y and a − c are sufficiently large, I2 finds it optimal not to
12Notice that
∂kR22
∂y
≤ 0. As y increases, I2 decreases its optimal licensing. When y gets
very large, I2 just license to one monopolist firm. This case is ruled out by our assumption
that inventions are non-drastic.
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license all the firms with a licence from I1. BR2 increases in a− c due to more
surplus in the market. kR12 increases in N since as N increases, the marginal
benefit, FR12 , increases, while the marginal cost decreases.
We partition the parameter space as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 for the
analysis.
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Proposition 2 I2’s best response is
13
13We have the complete characterisation of BR2 in terms of the primitives when the para-
meter space is partitioned further. The results are not presented here.
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(Case 1)
BR2 =


k1 k1 ≤ k1
[
kR12 , k2 = k1
]
;
kR12 k1
[
kR12 , k2 = k1
]
≤ k1 < a−cx+y ;
kR12 or k1 or k
R2
2
a−c
x+y ≤ k1 < max
{
k1
[
kR12 , α1
]
, k1
[
kR22 , k2 = k1
]}
;
k1 or k
R2
2 max
{
k1
[
kR12 , α1
]
, k1
[
kR22 , k2 = k1
]}
≤ k1 < k1
[
kR22 , α2
]
.
(Case 2)
BR2 =

 k1 k1 ≤ k1
[
kR22 , k2 = k1
]
;
kR22 k1
[
kR22 , k2 = k1
]
≤ k1 ≤ k1
[
kR22 , α2
]
.
(Case 3)
BR2 =


k1 k1 ≤ min
{
k1
[
kR12 , α1
]
, a−c
x+y
}
;
kR12 k1
[
kR12 , α1
]
≤ k1 ≤ k1
[
kR12 , α1
]
;
α1 max
{
k1
[
kR12 , α1
]
, a−c
x+y
}
< k1 < k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
;
kR22 k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
≤ k1 ≤ k1
[
k22, α2
]
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let k1 [., .] give the intersection point of the two functions specified in the
brackets. For example, k1
[
kR12 , k2 = k1
]
gives the k1 value at which k
R1
2 inter-
sects the forty-five degree line.
An example of I2’s best response is given in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: An example of I2’s best response. This occurs for parameter ranges
given in Case 3.
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In this example, in region one, when k1 is very small, k2 is constrained by
k1 and BR2 travels along the forty-five degree line. BR2 then traces k
R1
2 before
hitting the boundary of region one and two, α1. Once it hits the boundary, it
travels along α1 until k1
[
α1, k
R2
2
]
and then travels along kR22 .
4.3 The first generation technology licensing
Since inventors move sequentially, I1 takes into consideration I2’s best response
when solving for its optimal licensing. As in the second generation licensing
game, F1 needs to satisfy firms’ incentive compatibility constraints. There are
two constraints concerning the maximum fee I1 can charge. The equilibrium fee
must be low enough so that firms in groups k2 and k1 − k2 would still remain
being licensees. Denote them by FRm11 and F
Rm
12 respectively. On the other
hand, there are two incentive constraints concerning the minimum fee. The
equilibrium fee needs to be large enough so that firms in group N − k1 would
not want to switch to k2 or k1−k2. Denote them by FRm13 and FRm14 . Being the
first mover, I1 cannot price discriminate and therefore the four sets of incentive
constraints need to be satisfied simultaneously.14 Inventor one cannot license
more firms than in the market, k1 ≤ N . Similar to the argument applied in the
improvement licensing game, the maximum fee I1 can charge is pinned down by
the market structure and is uniquely defined by k1. We solve I1’s problem by
solving for the optimal k1.
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Lemma 4 FRm11 ≥ FRm12 and FRm14 ≥ FRm13 . The maximum fee inventor one
can charge is FRm12 .
Proof. The profit difference for firms switching from k2 to N −k1 is greater
than that for firms switching from k1 − k2 to N − k1. The more efficient firms
always have more profit in equilibrium, although the profit difference is small
enough that firms in other groups do not have the incentive to switch. If it is the
14 In the first period licensing game, all firms are homogenous with marginal cost c. I1’s
inability to price discriminate implies that it cannot specify the fee to be contingent on firms’
licensing decision in the second licensing game.
15FR11 (k1) is monotonic in k1. F
R2
1 (k1) is uniquely defined by k1. However, for a given
FR21 there might be multiple k1 which can induce it. Note that since Π1 = F1 (k1) k1, the
optimal licensing is max
{
F−11 (k1)
}
whenever F−11 (k1) is multi-valued.
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case that the more efficient firms have less profit than a less efficient one, the firm
would always want to switch to be a non-licensee. By doing so, the firm’s profit
increases, the market is less competitive with one less efficient firm, and the firm
does not have to pay the fee.16 This cannot occur in equilibrium. Note that
FRm12 ≥ FRm14 and four sets of incentive constraints are satisfied simultaneously
in equilibrium.
We summarise F1 for different regions in the following lemma.
Lemma 5
F1 =


(2 (a− c+ x)− x (2k1 −N)− 2k2y) xN(N+1)2 if k2 < α1;
x2N N+2
(N+1)2
if k2 = α1;(
a−c−k1x−k2y
k1+1
+ x
)2
if k2 > α1.
As discussed previously, when the equilibrium is on the boundary of region
one and two, k2 = α1, when one firm within group k1 considers whether or not
to remain a licensee, its outside opportunity is not zero. When the original equi-
librium is exactly on the boundary, with one less efficient firm in the market, the
equilibrium falls back to region one and all three groups of firms can have pos-
itive output. That is, when k2 = α1 and the market structure is (α1, k1 − α1),
the firm which deviates and switches from group k1 − α1 to N − k1 can still
have positive profit. Once the firm switches, there is one less efficient firm in
the market, leaving N − k1 firms with some positive profit and the market is in
region one with the structure (α1, k1 − α1 − 1, N − k1 + 1). Therefore, on the
boundary,
FR212 [k2 = α1] = x
2N
N + 2
(N + 1)2
.
F1 depends on the market region, k1, and k2. The following lemma summarise
k1’s optimal licensing for given BR2 in each region.
Lemma 6
k∗1 =


2(a−c+x−y)−Ny
4x if BR2 = k
R1
2 ;
2(a−c+x)+xN
4(x+y) if BR2 = k1;
−(2a−2c+2x+y)+
√
(2a−2c+2x+y)2+8y(a−c+x−y)
2y if BR2 = k
R2
2 ;
−(a−c+x+3y)+
√
((a−c+x+y)(a−c+x+9y))
2y if BR2 = k1 and k2 > α1;
max
{
a−c
x+y , k1
[
kR22 , α1
]}
if k2 = α1.
16We do not allow for negative fees.
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and
Π1 = F1 (k1) k
∗
1 .
Note that increasing N decreases I1’s marginal benefit of raising k1, F1,
by making the market more competitive. However, lager N also reduces the
marginal cost of raising k1 by decreasing firms’ outside opportunity for not
getting a licence. In region one, the latter effect dominates and k∗1 increases in
N .
When I2 licenses exactly on the boundary, I1 would license as many licences
as possible provided that BR2 = α1. Note that α1 is downward sloping. As
inventor one increases its licensing, inventor two decreases the licensing of the
second generation technology.17
The optimal licensing and profit for I1 is summarised in the following propo-
sition. Figures 5 and 6 depict k∗1 in (N, a− c) space.
Proposition 3 I1’s optimal licensing is: When y ≤ 2x
k∗1 =


N if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ;
2(a−c+x)+xN
4(x+y) if
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
;
a−c
x+y if N ≥
2(a−c−x)
x
.
Π∗1 =


(2 (a− c+ x)−N (x+ 2y))x N2
(N+1)2
if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ;
1
8 [2 (a− c+ x) + xN ]
2 xN
(N+1)2(x+y)
if 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
;
x2N N+2
(N+1)2
a−c
x+y if N ≥
2(a−c−x)
x
.
When y ≥ 2x
k∗1 =


N if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ;
2(a−c−x−y)
4x+y
if a− c ≥ 2(x+y)2
y−2x ,
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)−
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
≤ N ≤
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)+
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
and N ≥ 2(a−c−x−y)4x+y or N ≥ 2a−c−xx ;
a−c
x+y if a− c ≤
2(x+y)2
y−2x , N ≥
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y , and N ≥ 2a−c−xx ;
2(a−c+x)+xN
4(x+y) Otherwise.
17Since α1 is the boundary between region one and two, to stay on the boundary with the
group N − k1 having exactly zero output, as k1 increases, k2 must decrease.
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Π∗1 =


(2(a−c+x)−N(x+2y))xN2
(N+1)2
if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ;
2x2N(N+2)(a−c−x−y)
(4x+y)(N+1)2
if a− c ≥ 2(x+y)2
y−2x ,
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)−
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
≤ N ≤
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)+
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
and N ≥ 2(a−c−x−y)4x+y or N ≥ 2a−c−xx ;
x2N N+2
(N+1)2
a−c
x+y if a− c ≤
2(x+y)2
y−2x , N ≥
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y , and N ≥ 2a−c−xx ;
[2(a−c+x)+xN ]2xN
8(N+1)2(x+y)
Otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that if the optimal licensing is in region two, the solution is always on
the boundary. I1 always just licenses enough to drive inefficient firms out of the
market.
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4(x+y)
k∗1 =
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x+y
Figure 5: k∗1 in (N, a− c) space. (a) y < 2x
When y ≤ 2x, in equilibrium, k2 = k1. I2 licenses every firm which has got
a licence from I1. Therefore, if it is in region one, there are two groups of firms
in the market, firms with marginal costs c and c − x − y. If the market is in
region two, there is only one group of firms in the market: firms with marginal
cost c − x − y. When y ≥ 2x, for sufficiently large N and a − c, k1 > k2 in
equilibrium.
Remark 1 I1’s optimal licensing and profit decreases as y increases. Note that
when y = 0, the results are the same as Kamien and Tauman (1986).
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Figure 6: k∗1 in (N, a− c) space. (b) y ≥ 2x
In this model, the first technology cannot block the second one since the
latter is complementary to the former. The assumption that the subscription of
the second technology requires a licence of the first prevents the first generation
technology being driven out of the market. But with a more efficient second
technology in the market, firms face more intensive competition and therefore
the rent I1 can extract is reduced.
Note that as a − c increases, there is more surplus in the market and it is
more difficult to push the game into region two. On the other hand, with more
surplus, I1 increases its licensing and k
∗
1 increases. It is shown that the first
effect dominate and k∗1 gets into region two when a− c is small. Secondly, when
x and y are large, the licensees are more efficient and the market enters region
two with smaller k1 and k2. Finally, when y and a − c are sufficiently large,
k∗2 < k
∗
1 . The intuition is that when y and a− c are large, I2 has more market
power and it reduces the number of licences issued to extract more rents.
5 Royalty Payment Scheme
The timing of the moves is the same as in the fixed payment game. In the
first licensing game, I1 announces its royalty charge, r1, and N firms decide
simultaneously whether or not to get a licence from I1. In the second licensing
game, after observing r1 and firms’ licensing decisions, I2 announces its royalty
20
charge, r2. I2 can only license to firms with a licence from I1.
The N firm Cournot game is the same as the one in the fixed fee regime with
firms’ marginal costs after licensing games being c, c−x+r1, and c−x−y+r1+r2.
Lemma 7 In equilibrium r1 = x and r2 = y and all N firms get both licences.
Given that the reduction of marginal cost from getting a licence from I2 is
y − r2, firms would only get a licence from inventor two if
r2 ≤ y. (3)
For I1, the firm remains getting a licence from inventor one if
x+ y − r2 ≥ r1. (4)
The equilibrium is r1 = x and r2 = y, and all firms get licences from both
inventors.
Lemma 8 In the royalty payment scheme,
Π1 = x
(
a− c
N + 1
)
N
and
Π2 = y
(
a− c
N + 1
)
N.
Note that Πi does not depend on the cost saving of Ij ’s technology.
6 Comparison between Two Payment Schemes
Lemma 9 When y is sufficiently large, I1 always prefers licensing by royalty
payment. The following critical y values, yˆ, give the lower bounds of y above
which the royalty payment out-performs the fixed fee scheme given I1’s optimal
licensing as described in Proposition 3.
yˆ =


(a−c)(N−1)+2Nx−N2x
2N2 if k
∗
1 = N ;
4(a−c)2−4(a−c)xN+x2(2+N)2
8(a−c)(N+1) if k
∗
1 =
2(a−c+x)+xN
4(x+y) ;
x
N+1 if k
∗
1 =
a−c
x+y ;
a− c− x− (a−c)(4x+y)(N+1)2x(N+2) if k∗1 = 2a−c−x−y4x+y .
Note that when k∗1 = 2
a−c−x−y
4x+y , I1 always prefers licensing by royalty pay-
ment.
21
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that as N gets large and I1’s optimal licensing gets into region two, it
is usually the case that the royalty payment scheme is better than the fixed fee
scheme for I1. The following proposition summarises the parameter ranges for
the royalty payment scheme to out-perform the fixed fee payment scheme.
Proposition 4 For I1, the royalty payment scheme out-performs the fixed fee
payment scheme if the following constraints are satisfied simultaneously.
When y ≤ 2x:
(1) if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y and (a− c) ≤
(x+2y)N2−2xN
(N−1) ;
(2)
if 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
and
(x+2y)(a−c)−x2−
√
8(x+y)(a−c)(2y(a−c)−x2)
x2
≤ N ≤ (x+2y)(a−c)−x
2+
√
8(x+y)(a−c)(2y(a−c)−x2)
x2
;
(3) if N ≥ 2(a−c−x)
x
and x−y
y
(x+ y) ≤ a− c.
When y ≥ 2x:
(1) if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y and (a− c) ≤
(x+2y)N2−2xN
(N−1) ;
(2)
if a− c ≥ 2(x+y)2
y−2x ,
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)−
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y) ≤ N
≤ 3y(a−c)−(8x
2+9xy+4y2)+
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
and N ≥ 2(a−c−x−y)4x+y or N ≥ 2a−c−xx ;
(3) if a− c ≤ 2(x+y)2
y−2x and N ≥ 2a−c−xx ;
(4)
if N ≥ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y , N ≤ 2a−c−xx ,
N ≤ 3y(a−c)−(8x
2+9xy+4y2)−
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y) ,
N ≥ 3y(a−c)−(8x
2+9xy+4y2)+
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y) ,
and N ≥ (x+2y)(a−c)−x
2
−
√
8(x+y)(a−c)(2y(a−c)−x2)
x2
.
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that for y ≥ 2x, the royalty payment scheme always out-performs the
fixed payment scheme when the equilibrium falls into region two. When facing
an I2 with more superior technology, it is more likely that I1 would prefer
licensing by royalty payment.
We report the simulation results for the comparison between the two schemes
for I1 in Figure 7. In the figure, for given x and y combinations, we compare
fixed fee and royalty schemes in (N, a− c) space. In Figure 7, for parameter
ranges above the plotted curve, fixed fee payments dominate royalty payments
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for I1.
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Figure 7: Comparison of royalty and fixed fee payments for I1.
From simulation results, in (N, a− c) space, the parameter range for fixed fee
licensing to dominate royalty licensing shrinks as y increases. The key intuition
comes from firms’ incentive compatibility constraints for getting licences in a
Cournot competition market. With fixed fees, when the game gets to the second
licensing subgame, F1 is sunk and I2 is able to extract most rents brought about
by its own invention. The profit inventor one gets with fixed fee is constrained
by the incentive compatibility constraint of firms which only get a licence from
inventor one. For these firms, the existence of the second generation technology
and therefore more efficient producers in the market merely hurts their profit.
The bigger y is, the lower the profit for these firms and thus the smaller the
18Analytically, we were not able to rule out other conditions. However, for most of the
parameter combinations we use in the simulation, (a− c) ≤ (x+2y)N
2
−2xN
(N−1)
is a sufficient
condition for the royalty scheme to out-perform the fixed fee scheme for I1. Note that the
range N < 1 is ruled out since we do not analyse the possibility of monopoly.
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profit difference I1 can extract. Such a phenomenon does not occur with royalty
payments since royalty impacts on firms’ marginal costs and is not sunk. There-
fore, the more significant the second generation technology, the more likely I1
would prefer to license by royalty payment.
7 Endogenous Choice of Licensing Schemes
In this section, we analyse inventors’ optimal licensing when inventors can choose
different licensing scheme endogenously.
Lemma 10 For some parameter ranges, I2 always prefers licensing by fixed fee.
Proof. The proof consists of two parts.
(1) When I1 licenses by fixed fee, for some parameter ranges, I2 prefers
licensing by fixed fee. Please see the appendix for proof.
(2) When I1 licenses by royalty, I2 prefers licensing by fixed fee. For r1 ≤ x,
all firms get a licence from I1. I2 faces N firms with marginal cost c− x+ r1.
The problem is the same as the one inventor case in Kamien and Tauman (1984,
1986). The result follows that I2 prefers licensing by fixed payment. The case
r1 > x may cause some complication but does not affect our conclusion in the
following proposition and will be discussed in the proof.
Proposition 5 If y is significant, for some parameter ranges, I1 licenses by
royalty payment and I2 licenses by fixed fee.
Proof. See the appendix.
Let’s first look at the one inventor case. When there is only one inventor in
the market, if the marginal cost of licensing is zero, the optimal two part tariff
should be that the inventor charges zero tariff and extracts the total surplus by
a fixed fee.19 It is not an exact analogy here since by licensing one more firm,
there is more intense competition in the market and fees collectable from other
licensees decrease. Therefore, the marginal cost of licensing is not zero. In the
literature, it is shown that for a single inventor, this effect is dominated and
the inventor prefers licensing by a fixed fee than by a royalty. When there are
19We thank Matthew Ryan for suggesting this analogy.
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two inventors, we show that for some parameter ranges, it is still the case that
the second inventor would always prefer licensing by fixed fee. However, being
the first mover, I1 prefers licensing by royalty payment to prevent its licensing
charge becoming a sunk cost.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, with the inclusion of a second generation technology, we show
that the early inventor would prefer licensing by royalty payments than by fixed
fee payments. This offers another explanation for the popularity of royalty
licensing. The paper suggests that we should observe more royalty payment
in industries characterised by a high degree of cumulativeness in technology.
When inventors can choose licensing schemes independently, this paper offers a
testable prediction and suggests that the early inventors would prefer licensing
by royalty while the subsequent inventors would prefer licensing by a fixed fee.
One main assumption in this paper is that firms must have both licences
to utilise the second generation technology. This assumption is justifiable for
blocking patents and add-on technologies. It is true that even if the technologies
are sequential, the second technology may not be an add-on technology or the
second inventor may be able to invent around the first technology and it is not
necessary to have both licences in order to use the second technology. We are
currently working on such a setting.20 Another way of releasing this assumption
is to allow for the possibility of a imitation and litigation game.
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9 Appendix
Proof. Lemma 4. The following intersection points are important for de-
termining if I2’s local maximisers fall into the relevant regions, and hence for
determining the shape of the best response. They are the intersection points of
the local maximisers, the two boundaries, and the 45 degree line:
k1
[
kR12 , α1
]
=
a− c− x− y
x
−N
(
2x+ y
2x
)
, (5)
k1
[
kR12 , k2 = k1
]
=
2 (a− c+ x+ y) +N (2x+ y)
2 (x+ 2y)
, (6)
k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
= 2
a− c− x− y
y + 4x
, (7)
k1
[
kR22 , α2
]
=
2 (a− c+ x− y)
y
, (8)
k1
[
kR22 , k2 = k1
]
=
2 (a− c+ x+ y)
3y
, (9)
and
k1 [α1, k2 = k1] =
a− c
(x+ y)
.
In region one, the local maximiser falls into region one if k1
[
kR12 , k2 = k1
]
≤
a−c
x+y . Or if
N ≤ 2y (a− c)− (x+ y)
2
(2x+ y) (x+ y)
. (10)
The condition can only be satisfied if the N required is positive, or if
(a− c) ≥ (x+ y)
2
y
. (11)
The local optimiser for region two, kR22 , enters into the relevant region af-
ter intersecting with α1 or with the 45 degree line, whichever gives k1 ≥
(a− c) / (x+ y). Compare the intersection points of kR22 and α1 and the 45
degree line respectively:
k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
= 2
a− c− x− y
y + 4x
≥ a− c
x+ y
28
if
(a− c)
(
2
y + 4x
− 1
x+ y
)
≥ 2 x+ y
y + 4x
.
The LHS is positive if y ≥ 2x. Therefore, for y ≥ 2x, k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
≥ a−c
x+y if
(a− c) ≥ 2(x+ y)
2
y − 2x . (12)
In this case kR22 intersects with α1 when it enters region two.
For y ≤ 2x, it is always the case that k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
≤ (a− c) / (x+ y), which
means that kR22 enters region two after intersecting with the 45 degree line.
When y ≤ 2x, the best response is everywhere higher than (a− c) / (x+ y) and
therefore does not enter region one.
The best response kR22 intersects with α2 at k1
[
kR22 , α2
]
given in Equation
8. This level is greater than the k1 value at which k
R2
2 intersects with the 45
degree line if
a− c ≥ 2y − x. (13)
This holds for given Assumption 2 if
y ≤ 2x.
We know that for 2x ≤ y and sufficiently large a−c, kR22 enters region two after
intersecting with α1 and k1
[
kR22 , α2
]
≥ k1
[
kR22 , k2 = k1
]
. Therefore, it is only
the case that k1
[
kR22 , α2
]
≤ k1 [α2, k2 = k1] if y ≥ 2x and a− c ≤ 2y − x. Note
that 2y − x ≤
[
2 (x+ y)
2
]
/ (y − 2x) for y ≥ 2x.
Proof. Proposition 3:
Case 1:
BR2 is interior in region one. To stay in this case, we need N ≤ k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
.
Therefore, the game never enters region two. The game does not enter the
second part of region one, defined by BR2, if
N ≤ 2 (a− c+ x+ y)
3y
This is satisfied in this case if
(a− c) (2x− y) + 2x2 + 4xy + 2y2 ≥ 0
This holds for sure for y ≤ 2x. For y ≥ 2x, this holds for
(a− c) ≤ 2 (x+ y)
2
(y − 2x) .
29
For the area above (a− c) = 2(x+y)2(y−2x) , we first check if the optimal solution in
the second part of region one is interior. It is always constrained by N if
kR11
[
k2 = k
R1
2
]
≥ 2a− c− x− y
4x+ y
or
N ≤ 2y (a− c) + 8x
2 + xy − y2
y (4x+ y)
.
This holds for sure in this case since
8x2 + xy − y2 ≥ − (x+ y) y.
The optimal profit in the first part of region one is higher than the constrained
optimal in the second part of region one if
[2 (a− c+ x) + xN ]2 xN
8 (N + 1)
2
(x+ y)
≥ (2 (a− c+ x− y)−N (2x+ y))xN
2
2 (N + 1)
2
or if
(3x+ 2y)
2
N2 − 4
(
(x+ 2y) (a− c) +
(
x2 − 2y2
))
N + 4 (a− c+ x)2 ≥ 0.
This is true for all N . Therefore, the optimal solution is in the first part of
region one, interior or constrained by N . k∗R11 [k2 = k1] falls within the relevant
N range if
1
4
2a− 2c+ xN + 2x
x+ y
≤ 1
2
2 (a− c) + 2x (N + 1) + y (N + 2)
x+ 2y
.
This holds since
N
(
3x2 + 4xy + 2y2
)
+ 2x (a− c) + 2x2 + 4xy + 4y2 > 0.
This solution is not constrained by N if21
N ≥ 2 (a− c+ x)
(3x+ 4y)
.
Provided that the parameter space is within this case, the optimal licensing for
I1 is
k∗1 =

 N if N ≤
2(a−c+x)
(3x+4y) ,
kR11 [k2 = k1] =
1
4
2a−2c+xN+2x
x+y Otherwise.
21Note that 2(a−c+x)
(3x+4y)
≥ 2
y(a−c)−(x+y)2
(2x+y)(x+y)
when
√
2
3
x ≥ y. When y is very small relative to
x, the optimal solution in the first part of region one is always constrained. When y is small,
I1 always wants to license too much relative to the total market size given in this case.
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The optimal profit is
Π∗1 =

 (2 (a− c+ x)−N (x+ 2y))x
N2
(N+1)2
if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)(3x+4y) ,
1
8 [2 (a− c+ x) + xN ]
2 xN
(N+1)2(x+y)
Otherwise.
Case 2:
I2’s best response in region one falls outside the region and I2’s licensing is
constrained at k2 = k1. I2’s best response in region two is either interior or
enters region two with k1
[
kR22 , k2 = k1
]
≥ a−c
x+y . k
∗R1
1 [k2 = k1] falls within the
region if
1
4
2 (a− c+ x) + xN
x+ y
<
a− c
x+ y
.
This holds if
N <
2 (a− c− x)
x
.
It can be verified that 2(a−c−x)
x
≥ 2y(a−c)−(x+y)2(2x+y)(x+y) for the relevant parameter
range. Therefore, for 2y(a−c)−(x+y)
2
(2x+y)(x+y) ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
, the local maximum falls
into region one. For N > 2(a−c−x)
x
, it is a corner solution in region two.
In region two, k∗R21 [k2 = k1] falls into the relevant region if
a− c
x+ y
≤ − (a− c+ x+ 3y) +
√
((a− c+ x+ y) (a− c+ x+ 9y))
2y
≤ 2 (a− c+ x+ y)
3y
.
The first part of the inequality holds if
a− c
x+ y
≤ − (a− c+ x+ 3y) +
√
((a− c+ x+ y) (a− c+ x+ 9y))
2y
.
This does not hold since
(a− c) ≥ x
2 + xy
(x+ 2y)
.
Thus k∗R21 [k2 = k1] falls into region one. The solution is a corner solution with
k∗1 =
a−c
x+y and
ΠR21
(
k1 =
a− c
x+ y
)
= x2N
N + 2
(N + 1)2
a− c
x+ y
.
In region two, kR21
[
k2 = k
R2
2
]
falls into the relevant region if
2 (a− c+ x+ y)
3y
≤ −(2a−2c+2x+y)+
√
(2a−2c+2x+y)2+8y(a−c+x−y)
2y
≤ 2 (a− c+ x− y)
y
.
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The first part of the inequality does not hold since
64
(
a2 − 2ac+ c2
)
+ 128x (a− c) + 32y (a− c) + 64x2 + 32xy + 112y2 ≥ 0.
Therefore, it is a corner solution with k1 =
2(a−c+x+y)
3y . However, from the
previous analysis, when k2 = k1, the optimal solution in region two is
a−c
x+y . In
region two, I1 just license enough to drive firms without any licences out of the
market.
If the local optimiser in region one falls outside the region, the optimal
response for I1 is
a−c
x+y . Otherwise, we need to compare the profit levels for the
two local optimum. ΠR11 ≥ ΠR21 if
(2 (a− c+ x) + xN)2 xN
8 (N + 1)2 (x+ y)
≥ x2N N + 2
(N + 1)2
a− c
x+ y
or
(−2a+ 2c+ 2x+ xN)2 ≥ 0.
This is always true. Therefore, as long as the optimal licensing falls within
region one, the global optimal is also in region one. Therefore, the optimal
licensing is
k∗1 =


N if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y
1
4
2(a−c+x)+xN
x+y if
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
a−c
x+y Otherwise
The optimal profit is
Π∗1 =


x(2(a−c+x)−N(x+2y))N2
(N+1)2
if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y
(2(a−c+x)+xN)2xN
8(N+1)2(x+y)
if 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
x2N N+2
(N+1)2
a−c
x+y Otherwise
Case 3:
I2’s best response in region two is interior with k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
≥ a−c
x+y . I2’s best
response in region one could be interior or falls outside of the region.22
If I2’s best response in region one, k
R1
1
[
k2 = k
R1
2
]
= 2(a−c+x−y)−Ny4x , falls
into the region if
2 (a− c) + 2x (N + 1) + y (N + 2)
2 (x+ 2y)
≤ 2 (a− c+ x− y)−Ny
4x
<
a− c
x
− (N + 1)− N + 2
2x
y.
22
I2 ’ s r e g io n o n e b e s t r e s p o n s e i s in t e r io r fo r N ≤ 2
y(a−c)−(x+y)2
(2x+y)(x+y)
.
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The second half of the inequality holds if
N <
2a− 2c− 6x− 2y
4x+ y
.
This can never hold in this case since 2a−2c−6x−2y4x+y ≤ 2a−c−x−y4x+y . Therefore, the
optimal solution in the second part of region one always falls into region two.
The local optimum occurs at the corner solution, k1 = k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
. To find I1’s
optimal licensing, we need to compare the profit from the interior solution in
the first part of region one and the corner solution at k1 = k1
[
kR22 , α1
]
.
The profit level in the first part of region one is higher if
[2 (a− c+ x) + xN ]2 xN
8 (N + 1)
2
(x+ y)
≥ x2N N + 2
(N + 1)
2
2 (a− c− x− y)
4x+ y
.
This holds for
N ≤
(
3y (a− c)−
(
8x2 + 9xy + 4y2
))
x (4x+ y)
−
√
32 (y + x)
(
(a− c) (y − 2x)− 2 (y + x)2
)
(a− c− x− y)
x (4x+ y)
or
N ≥
(
3y (a− c)−
(
8x2 + 9xy + 4y2
))
x (4x+ y)
+
√
32 (y + x)
(
(a− c) (y − 2x)− 2 (y + x)2
)
(a− c− x− y)
x (4x+ y)
.
Profit in region one is higher for sure for all N if 2x ≥ y. If the second generation
technology is not too significant compared with the first one, I1 always prefers
staying in region one. At a− c = 2(y+x)2(y−2x) , the lower and upper bound coincide(
3y 2(y+x)
2
(y−2x) −
(
8x2 + 9xy + 4y2
))
x (4x+ y)
=
4x2 + 3xy + 2y2
x (y − 2x) .
This value is greater than the boundary value for Case 3 since
4x2 + 3xy + 2y2
x (y − 2x) ≥
2 (x+ y)
y − x .
Now check if the lower bound would always be greater than the boundary for
Case 3 and if the upper bound would always be less than the critical value for
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the region one solution to be interior.(
3y (a− c)−
(
8x2 + 9xy + 4y2
))
x (4x+ y)
−
√
32 (y + x)
(
(a− c) (y − 2x)− 2 (y + x)2
)
(a− c− x− y)
x (4x+ y)
≥ 2a− c− x− y
4x+ y
if
(a− c)2
(
−23y2 + 20xy + 68x2
)
+2
(
83xy2 + 44yx2 + 36y3 + 12x3
)
(a− c)
− (4y + x) (y + 2x)
(
12y2 + 23xy + 14x2
)
≥ 0.
For 2x ≤ y ≤ 2. 208 4x, the inequality holds for
a− c ≥ −(83xy
2+44yx2+36y3+12x3)+(y+4x)
√
32(y+x)(6y3+19xy2+20yx2+4x3)
(−23y2+20xy+68x2)
Since we know that at a−c = 2(x+y)2
y−2x , this holds. It holds for all the a−c range
in Case 3.
For y ≥ 2. 208 4x, the inequality holds for
(83xy2+44yx2+36y3+12x3)−(y+4x)
√
32(y+x)(6y3+19xy2+20yx2+4x3)
(23y2−20xy−68x2)
≤ a− c ≤ (83xy
2+44yx2+36y3+12x3)+(y+4x)
√
32(y+x)(6y3+19xy2+20yx2+4x3)
(23y2−20xy−68x2)
There is a upper bound for a− c. Since a− c value is not bounded in Case 3,
this does not hold for sufficiently large a− c.
Now check if the upper bound is always less than 2a−c−x
x
.(
3y (a− c)−
(
8x2 + 9xy + 4y2
))
x (4x+ y)
+
√
32 (y + x)
(
(a− c) (y − 2x)− 2 (y + x)2
)
(a− c− x− y)
x (4x+ y)
≤ 2a− c− x
x
if
(a− c) (8x− y) ≤ −y (4y + 7x)
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This is never true if 8x ≥ y. If 8x < y, this is true if
(a− c) ≥ y (4y + 7x)
(y − 8x)
When kR12 = k1, the optimal k1 is
1
4
2a−2c+xN+2x
x+y . The solutio is interior if
N ≤ 2a−2c−2x
x
.
I1’s optimal licensing in this case is
k∗1 =


1
4
2(a−c+x)+xN
x+y
if N ≤ 3y(a−c)−(8x
2+9xy+4y2)−
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
or
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)+
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
≤ N ≤ 2a−2c−2x
x
2(a−c−x−y)
4x+y Otherwise
.
Π∗1 =


[2(a−c+x)+xN ]2xN
8(N+1)2(x+y)
if N ≤ 3y(a−c)−(8x
2+9xy+4y2)−
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
or
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)+
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
≤ N ≤ 2a−2c−2x
x
2x2N(N+2)(a−c−x−y)
(4x+y)(N+1)2
Otherwise
Proof. of Lemma 9 and Proposition 4:
When N ≤ 2(a−c+x)(3x+4y) , I1 has higher profit in the royalty payment scheme if
(2 (a− c+ x)−N (x+ 2y))x N
2
(N + 1)2
≤ x
(
a− c
N + 1
)
N.
Or if
(2 (a− c+ x)−N (x+ 2y)) N
(N + 1)
≤ (a− c) .
Notice that this is always true for sufficiently large y
y ≥ (a− c) (N − 1) + 2Nx−N
2x
2N2
.
The lower bound of y increases with a− c and decreases with x for N ≥ 2. For
y not so large, this holds for
(a− c) ≤ (x+ 2y)N
2 − 2xN
(N − 1) .
Equivalently, it holds for
N ≤
a− c+ 2x−
√
(a− c)2 − 8y (a− c) + 4x2
2 (x+ 2y)
or N ≥
a− c+ 2x+
√
(a− c)2 − 8y (a− c) + 4x2
2 (x+ 2y)
.
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Therefore, the royalty payment scheme gives I1 higher profit whenN ≤ 2(a−c+x)(3x+4y)
and (a− c) ≤ (x+2y)N2−2xN(N−1) .
For N ≥ 2(a−c+x)(3x+4y) , the optimal solution in the first part of region one is not
constrained by N . I1 has higher profit in the royalty payment scheme if
x
(
a− c
N + 1
)
N ≥ 1
8
[2 (a− c+ x) + xN ]2 xN
(N + 1)2 (x+ y)
This holds for sufficiently large y:
y ≥ 4 (a− c)
2 − 4 (a− c)xN + x2 (2 +N)2
8 (a− c) (N + 1) .
or
x2N2 + 4
(
x2 − (x+ 2y) (a− c)
)
N + 4
(
(a− c)2 − 2y (a− c) + x2
)
≤ 0.
The inequality holds for
(x+ 2y) (a− c)− x2 −
√
8 (x+ y) (a− c) (2y (a− c)− x2)
x2
≤ N ≤ (x+ 2y) (a− c)− x
2 +
√
8 (x+ y) (a− c) (2y (a− c)− x2)
x2
(x+ 2y) (a− c)− x2 +
√
8 (x+ y) (a− c) (2y (a− c)− x2)
x2
≥ 2a− c− x
x
if √
8 (x+ y) (a− c) (2y (a− c)− x2) ≥ (a− c) (x− 2y)− x2
This holds for sure for x2 ≤ y.
When k∗1 in the fixed payment scheme is
a−c
x+y , I1 has higher profit in the
royalty payment scheme if
x
(
a− c
N + 1
)
N ≥ x2N N + 2
(N + 1)
2
a− c
x+ y
.
or if
(N + 1) (x+ y) ≥ (N + 2)x.
This holds if
x− y
y
≤ N.
Check the boundary value:
x− y
y
≤ a− c
x+ y
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if
x− y
y
(x+ y) ≤ a− c
This holds for sure if y ≥ x2 .
When k∗1 = 2
a−c−x−y
4x+y in the fixed payment scheme, I1 has higher profit in
the royalty payment scheme if
x
(
a− c
N + 1
)
N ≥ 2x
2N (N + 2) (a− c− x− y)
(4x+ y) (N + 1)
2
This holds for sufficiently large y:
y ≥ a− c− x− (a− c) (4x+ y) (N + 1)
2x (N + 2)
This holds for sure. Therefore, for N ≥ 2a−2c−2x
x
, it is always the case that the
royalty payment scheme out-performs the fixed payment scheme.
Proof. of Lemma 10 Part (1):
When I1 licenses by fixed fee, and I2 licenses by royalty, since r2 impacts on
firms marginal cost, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium r2 = y
and k∗2 = k
∗
1 . It follows that
k∗1 =


N if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x ,
2(a−c+x)+xN
4x if
2(a−c+x)
3x ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
,
a−c
x
if N ≥ 2(a−c−x)
x
.
and
Π∗2 =


N (a− c+ x) y
N+1 if N ≤
2(a−c+x)
3x ,
(2a−2c+2x+xN)(2a−2c+2x+3xN)y
16x(N+1) if
2(a−c+x)
3x ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
,
(a− c) y if N ≥ 2(a−c−x)
x
.
When both inventors license by fixed fee, if y ≤ 2x
k∗2 =


N if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ,
2(a−c+x)+xN
4(x+y) if
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
,
a−c
x+y if N ≥
2(a−c−x)
x
.
and
Π∗2 =


(2 (a− c+ x+ y)−Ny) N2y
(N+1)2
if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ,
1
8yN (3xN + 2x+ 2a− 2c+ 2Ny + 4y) 2a−2c+2x+xN(x+y)(N+1)2 if
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
,
yN (Ny + 2y + 2xN + 2x) a−c
(x+y)(N+1)2
if N ≥ 2(a−c−x)
x
.
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When y ≥ 2x
k∗2 =


N if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y
2ax+ay−2cx−cy+2x2+2xy
(4x+y)y
if a− c ≥ 2(x+y)2
y−2x ,
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)−
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
≤ N ≤
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)+
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
and N ≥ 2(a−c−x−y)4x+y or N ≥ 2a−c−xx
a−c
x+y
if a− c ≤ 2(x+y)2
y−2x , N ≥
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y
, and N ≥ 2a−c−x
x
2(a−c+x)+xN
4(x+y) Otherwise
Π∗2 =


(2a−2c+2x+2y−Ny)N2y
(N+1)2
if N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ;
N(Ny+2y+2xN+2x)((2x+y)(a−c)+2x(x+y))
(N+1)2(4x+y)
if a− c ≥ 2(x+y)2
y−2x ,
3y(a−c)−(8x2+9xy+4y2)
x(4x+y)
−
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
≤ N ≤ 3y(a−c)−(8x
2+9xy+4y2)
x(4x+y)
+
√
32(y+x)((a−c)(y−2x)−2(y+x)2)(a−c−x−y)
x(4x+y)
and N ≥ 2(a−c−x−y)4x+y or N ≥ 2a−c−xx ;
yN(Ny+2y+2xN+2x)(a−c)
(x+y)(N+1)2
if a− c ≤ 2(x+y)2
y−2x , N ≥
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y , and N ≥ 2a−c−xx ;
(2(a−c+x)+xN)yN(3xN+2(a−c+x)+2Ny+4y)
8(N+1)2(x+y)
Otherwise.
Comparison of fixed fee and royalty for I2:
When N ≤ 2(a−c+x)3x+4y , I2 prefers licensing by fixed fee if
N (a− c+ x) y
N + 1
≤ (2 (a− c+ x+ y)−Ny) N
2y
(N + 1)2
This holds for
(a− c+ x+ 2y)−
√
(a− c)2 + 2x (a− c) + x2 + 4y2
2y
≤ N
≤
(a− c+ x+ 2y) +
√
(a− c)2 + 2x (a− c) + x2 + 4y2
2y
.
Note that
(a−c+x+2y)+
√
(a−c)2+2x(a−c)+x2+4y2
2y >
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y . I2’s optimal licens-
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ing scheme is
 Royalty if N ≤
(a−c+x+2y)−
√
(a−c)2+2x(a−c)+x2+4y2
2y ;
Fixed Fee If
(a−c+x+2y)−
√
(a−c)2+2x(a−c)+x2+4y2
2y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c+x)
3x+4y .
For 2(a−c+x)3x+4y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−x)
x
, I2 prefers licensing by fixed fee if
1
16
(2a− 2c+ 2x+ xN) (2a− 2c+ 2x+ 3xN) y
x (N + 1)
≤ 1
8
yN (3xN + 2x+ 2a− 2c+ 2Ny + 4y) 2a− 2c+ 2x+ xN
(x+ y) (N + 1)2
.
This holds for
N ≥ −(2(x−y)(a−c)−x(x−3y))+
√
((2(x−y)(a−c)−x(x−3y)))2+4x(3x+y)2(x+y)(a−c+x)
2x(3x+y) .
−(2(x−y)(a−c)−x(x−3y))+
√
((2(x−y)(a−c)−x(x−3y)))2+4x(3x+y)2(x+y)(a−c+x)
2x(3x+y)
≤ 2 (a− c+ x)
3x+ 4y
if √
((2 (x− y) (a− c)− x (x− 3y)))2 + 4x (3x+ y) 2 (x+ y) (a− c+ x)
≤ 18ax
2 − 18cx2 + 6xya− 6xyc+ 9x3 + 9yx2 − 8y2a+ 8y2c+ 12xy2
3x+ 4y
18ax2 − 18cx2 + 6xya− 6xyc+ 9x3 + 9yx2 − 8y2a+ 8y2c+ 12xy2
3x+ 4y
≥ 0
if
y ≤ 3 +
√
153
8
x
≃ 1. 921 2x.
Otherwise, it holds for
(a− c) ≤
(
9x3 + 9yx2 + 12xy2
)
2 (−9x2 − 3yx+ 4y2) .
For 9x2 + 3yx− 4y2 ≥ 0 or (a− c) ≤ (9x
3+9yx2+12xy2)
2(−9x2−3yx+4y2) , the inequality holds if
2 (x+ y) (3x− 2y) (a− c)− 3x3 − 8y3 − 13yx2 − 14xy2 ≥ 0.
This holds for large a− c or small y.
−(2(x−y)(a−c)−x(x−3y))+
√
((2(x−y)(a−c)−x(x−3y)))2+4x(3x+y)2(x+y)(a−c+x)
2x(3x+y)
≤ 2 (a− c− x)
x
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if √
((2 (x− y) (a− c)− x (x− 3y)))2 + 4x (3x+ y) 2 (x+ y) (a− c+ x)
≤ 2 (7x+ y) (a− c)− 13x2 − yx
The LHS≥ 0 if
(a− c) ≥ x (13x+ y)
2 (7x+ y)
.
For (a− c) ≥ x(13x+y)2(7x+y) , the inequality holds if
4 (a− c)2 − 8x (a− c) + 3x (x− y) ≥ 0
This holds for
a− c ≤ 2x−
√
x (x+ 3y)
2
or a− c ≥ 2x+
√
x (x+ 3y)
2
.
In this intermediate N regime, I2 prefers licensing by fixed fee if a− c is suffi-
ciently large.
For N ≥ 2(a−c−x)
x
, I2 prefers licensing by fixed fee payment if
(a− c) y ≤ yN (Ny + 2y + 2xN + 2x) a− c
(x+ y) (N + 1)
2
or √
x+ y
x
≤ N.
This holds for the entire parameter range for this case if√
x+ y
x
≤ 2 (a− c− x)
x
.
Or if
4 (a− c)2 − 8x (a− c) + x (3x− y) ≥ 0
This holds for
a− c ≤ 2x−
√
(x+ y)x
2
or a− c ≥ 2x+
√
(x+ y)x
2
.
Check the additional case for when y ≥ 2x and when a− c ≥ 2(x+y)2
y−2x . I2 prefers
licensing by fixed fee than by royalty if
N (Ny + 2y + 2xN + 2x) ((2x+ y) (a− c) + 2x (x+ y))
(N + 1)2 (4x+ y)
≥ (a− c) y
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or if
2x (2x (a− c) + (x+ y) (2x+ y))N2
+2x
(
(2x− y) (a− c) + 2 (x+ y)2
)
N − y (y + 4x) (a− c)
≥ 0
This holds for
a− c ≥ −x((2x−y)(a−c)+2(x+y)
2)+
√
x((2x+y)(a−c)+2x(x+y))((2x+5y)x(a−c)+2(x+y)3)
2x(2x(a−c)+(x+y)(2x+y)) .
When I1 licenses by fixed fee, we identified the parameter ranges for I2 to
choose to license by fixed fee. Furthermore, I2 is more likely to prefer licensing
by fixed fee if a− c is sufficiently large.
Proof. of Proposition 5:
Let’s first analyse the case r1 ≤ x. For r1 ≤ x, since it is effectively a
reduction of firms’ marginal cost, I1 can always charge r1 = x. Given that I1
sets r1 = x and k1 = N . The solution should be exactly the same as Kamien
and Tauman’s results.
k∗2 =


N if N ≤ 2(a−c+y)3y ,
2(a−c+y)+yN
4y if
2(a−c+y)
3y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−y)
y
,
a−c
y
if N ≥ 2(a−c−y)
y
.
When N ≤ 2(a−c+y)3y , both inventors license the whole market. N firms produce
with marginal cost c− y. The market aggregate quantity and price is
Q = N
a− c+ y
N + 1
and p =
a+Nc−Ny
N + 1
.
Each firm produces
a+Nc−Ny
N + 1
− (c− y) .
This gives
Π1 = N
(
a− c+ y
N + 1
)
x.
Note that in this case, Π1 [R,F ] > Π1 [R,R]. When I1 licenses by royalty, it
has higher profit when I2 licenses by fixed fee.
When 2(a−c+y)3y ≤ N ≤
2(a−c−y)
y
, k∗2 =
2(a−c+y)+yN
4y . This falls in region one.
There are two groups of firms in the market,
(
2(a−c+y)+yN
4y , N −
2(a−c+y)+yN
4y
)
.
The market price and quantity are
Q =
1
4
4Na− 4Nc+ 2a− 2c+ 2y + yN
N + 1
and p =
1
4
2a+ 4Nc+ 2c− 2y − yN
N + 1
.
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The two groups of firms have output
q1 =
1
4
2a+ 4Nc+ 2c− 2y − yN
N + 1
− c
and
q12 =
1
4
2a+ 4Nc+ 2c− 2y − yN
N + 1
− (c− y) .
I1’s profit is
Π1 =
(
N − 2 (a− c+ y) + yN
4y
)(
1
4
2a+ 4Nc+ 2c− 2y − yN
N + 1
− c
)
x
+
2 (a− c+ y) + yN
4y
(
1
4
2a+ 4Nc+ 2c− 2y − yN
N + 1
− (c− y)
)
x
=
1
4
x
4Na− 4Nc+ 2a− 2c+ 2y + yN
N + 1
.
Recall that when both inventors charge royalty, Π1 [R,R] = x
(
a−c
N+1
)
N . Π1 [R,F ] ≥
Π1 [R,R] if
1
4
x
4Na− 4Nc+ 2a− 2c+ 2y + yN
N + 1
≥ x
(
a− c
N + 1
)
N.
Or if
1
4
x
2a− 2c+ 2y + yN
N + 1
≥ 0.
This holds.
Finally, when N ≥ 2(a−c−y)
y
, the market structure is a−c
y
in the region that
only firms with licences from both inventors can produce positive quantities.
Q =
k2a
k2 + 1
−
(
k2c− k2y
k2 + 1
)
= k2
a− c+ y
k2 + 1
= a− c
and
p = c.
The only group of firm has output y. This give I1 profit
Π1 = (a− c)x.
Π1 [R,F ] ≥ Π1 [R,R] since
(a− c)x ≥ x
(
a− c
N + 1
)
N.
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We have shown in the previous section that for most parameter ranges,
Π1 (R,R) ≥ Π1 (F,F ) .
Therefore Π1 (R,F ) ≥ Π1 (F,F ). When I1 licenses by royalty, it gets higher
profit when I2 licenses by fixed fee than when I2 licenses by royalty. The intu-
ition is that when licensing by royalty, I1 gets higher profit when firms’ output
is higher. When I2 licenses by fixed fee, it does not affect firms incentive to
produce. Another reason is that this licensing scheme is a better approximation
of a two part tariff and is able to extract more rent in total.
Therefore, if we restrict the attention to parameter ranges which supports
that I2 chooses fixed fee licensing when I1 licenses by fixed fee, in equilibrium,
I1 licenses by royalty and I2 licenses by fixed fee.
There is one additional possibility. Would I1 be able to charge r1 > x?
Conditional on I2 still licenses by fixed fee, such a deviation, if observed in
equilibrium, must give higher payoff to I1 compared with r1 = x. This should
strengthen the argument here that I1 licenses by royalty and I2 licenses by fixed
fee. If I2 switches to licensing by royalty, I1 should remain licensing by royalty
since as soon as I1 switches to fixed fee, I2 switches to fixed fee as well and
Π1 (R,R) ≥ Π1 (F,F ).
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